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ESSAY

Extraterritoriality and the Rule of Law: Why
Friendly Foreign Democracies Oppose Novel,
Expansive U.S. Jurisdiction Claims by NonResident Aliens Under the Alien Tort Statute*
DONALD I. BAKER†

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 has implicated two basic
foreign policy concerns among some of America‘s most important
allies. The first concern is about human rights around the world, and
how to develop and effectively implement collective and unilateral
measures for discovering, punishing, and deterring those engaged in
committing basic human rights violations.2 The second concern is the
widely-shared view that the United States has adopted an overly
expansive view of extraterritorial jurisdiction combined with a unique
plaintiff-favoring litigation system, which encourages improper
forum shopping by private litigants seeking to win cases against

*

© 2013 by Baker & Miller PLLC. Based on a talk delivered at the symposium
Extraterritoriality Post-Kiobel: International and Comparative Legal Perspectives at the
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland on
November 16, 2012.
†
Partner, Baker & Miller PLLC; Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington
University Law School. Counsel of Record for the Governments of United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Australia, and/or Switzerland as amici curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Rio Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2011); Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); and Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). However, the views expressed are entirely based on
my own experience and do not purport to be on behalf of any government that we may have
represented in these or other cases involving U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. See FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HM GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS TOOLKIT: HOW UK OVERSEAS MISSIONS CAN PROMOTE GOOD CONDUCT BY
UK COMPANIES (2011); see also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF THE
NETHERLANDS, HUMAN RIGHTS MEMORANDUM: RESPONSIBLE FOR FREEDOM 23 (2011).
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foreign defendants based on a limited or non-existent nexus with the
United States.3
Moreover, on the human rights front, there appears to be
stronger political and official support in foreign capitals for treatybased cooperation arrangements with government-to-government
sanctions, such as trade embargos, which are more direct and
effective ways of punishing and deterring human rights violations by
a wrongdoing state.4 In addition, the United States is quietly
criticized in the international legal community for being unique
among leading democracies in having failed to support the creation of
the International Criminal Court, which is seen as a more focused
way of dealing with the worst human rights violators.
Under these circumstances, the Australian, British, and Dutch
governments have been leaders in trying to get the U.S. Supreme
Court to squarely face the issue of the proper limits on national
jurisdiction imposed by international law on private damage cases
brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).5 The United Kingdom
and Netherlands were finally successful with their first brief in
Kiobel.6
These foreign governments‘ basic argument in their briefs has
been that preserving the traditional international law restrictions on
3. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
26–29, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II] (―The
risks of improper interference with the rights of foreign sovereigns are significantly
enhanced in ATS (and other) cases because the U.S. has chosen to adopt plaintiff-favoring
rules and remedies that other nations do not accept [as a matter of public policy][.]‖).
4. Id. at 34–36 (―Protection against human rights abuses can be more fairly and
effectively achieved by seeking international consensus and cooperation through treaties
than by resort to private civil litigation in distant courts[.]‖).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of
Australia, the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 15–18, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339); Brief of the Governments of Australia and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners
on Certain Questions in their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15–18, Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, No. 11-649 (U.S. filed Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto Cert. Br.].
6. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents
at 29–33, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. I]
(―These numerous A.T.S. actions against foreign corporations for activities that have no
significant nexus with the U.S. reemphasize the importance of this court taking the first
available opportunity to make clear to the lower courts that an A.T.S. case should not be
allowed to proceed unless it can satisfy the basic limitation on national civil jurisdiction
imposed by international law[.]‖).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts is a more important policy
goal because it is consistent with the active pursuit of other
government-to-government initiatives that deal more directly with
human rights violations in faraway places.7 This choice is consistent
with the position taken by the U.S. government‘s earlier amicus
briefs on international law and comity in the ATS cases. 8 The U.S.
Solicitor General‘s second brief in Kiobel argued against U.S.
jurisdiction where foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign defendants for
foreign actions, while leaving the door open to possible assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases where the defendants were
American individuals or companies, or the foreign plaintiff was a
U.S. resident.9 When the Supreme Court issued its Kiobel decision on
April 17, 2013, all nine Justices accepted the Anglo-Dutch position,
with the Chief Justice‘s opinion for five Justices going somewhat
further in excluding foreign plaintiffs‘ ATS claims from the U.S.
courts.10

7. Id. at 25–27 (―Protection against human rights abuses can be more fairly and
effectively done by seeking international consensus [on ways to further improve the
protection of human rights] and [by] encouraging states to [implement] domestic legislation
that [enables them to carry out] their obligations under international human rights
instruments [to which they are party] within their jurisdiction[.]‖).
8. See generally Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Supporting
Affirmance of the Order of Dismissal, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 09-56381, 02-56256, 02-56390) (outlining the U.S. position in ATS cases that federal
law must comply with international law); Reply Brief for the United States at 5, Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 (No. 03-484) (asserting that it is the job of the Executive Branch to ensure that law
enforcement tactics comply with international law).
9. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 25–26, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S. Kiobel Br. II].
This brief is more extensively discussed in Part VI below. The Solicitor General‘s initial
brief in Kiobel, signed by the State and Commerce Departments, had supported the
Petitioners on the question of corporate liability. Brief of the United in Support of Petitioners
at 12–13, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S. Kiobel Br. I].
10. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. Justice Breyer‘s somewhat more tailored concurring
opinion pointed to the second Dutch-British brief as recognizing a few narrow exceptions to
the almost pure territoriality approach adopted by the majority. Id. at 1675–76 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 15–16, 19–
23). These limited exceptions involved potential suits for overseas torts based on nationality
principles or the presence of defendant individuals in the territory of the forum state. Justice
Breyer‘s opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, was seen
as an apparent effort to get the Court and the lower courts to stick more closely to the
cautious balancing which characterized Justice Soutor‘s majority opinion in Sosa. It seems
likely that he was trying to persuade Justice Kennedy to join, and thus have this opinion
become the majority opinion for the Court in Kiobel.
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TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

Ever since Chief Justice Marshall‘s early decisions involving
international shipping disputes, the Supreme Court has recognized
that international law places important limitations on the ability of the
U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over overseas individuals and
situations.11
Basically, international law has long provided that a sovereign
should only exercise civil jurisdiction over legal wrongs occurring
within its territory or at least having a substantial nexus with its
territory, citizens, and/or residents. Broader jurisdiction has long been
accepted for conduct occurring on the high seas, including piracy, on
the theory that such an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was
necessary if such wrongdoers were to be punished and it did not
infringe the jurisdiction of another sovereign.12 In the twentieth
century, the United States generated periodic diplomatic and legal
conflicts by going a step further and developing and using the socalled ―effects doctrine‖ to exercise national jurisdiction over foreign
parties for overseas activities that have a significant effect within
U.S. territory.13 Gradually, this concept has come to be more broadly
accepted and used by other major jurisdictions, when seen as ―part of
a single broad principle according to which the right to exercise
jurisdiction depends on there being between the subject matter and
the state exercising jurisdiction a sufficiently close connection to
justify that state in regulating the matter and perhaps also to override
any competing rights of other states.‖14
11. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains,‖ unless the act contains ―express words or a very plain and
necessary implication [to the contrary].‖); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812) (―The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.‖); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (―No principle of general law is more
universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have
equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on
another.‖).
12. Because piracy was an activity occurring on the high seas, ATS cases based on
piracy would not involve the U.S. courts attempting to exercise jurisdiction over conduct that
occurred in territory of a foreign sovereign. See Eugene Kontorovich, A Tort Statute, With
Aliens and Pirates, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COL. 100, 102–03 (2012) (discussing the impact of
piracy on the creation and interpretation of the ATS).
13. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (illustrating the
effects doctrine).
14. LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM‘S INTERNATIONAL LAW 457–58 (Sir Robert Jennings
& Sir Arthur Watts eds., Longmans 9th ed. 1992) (1905) (emphasis added).
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For generations, diplomatic tensions stemming from U.S.
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-resident foreign
parties have been intensified because the United States has chosen to
create a legal system that is far more favorable to private plaintiffs
than anything that any major foreign power has chosen to adopt. The
pro-plaintiff litigation advantages consist of potential punitive
damages, mandatory jury trials in civil damages cases, opt-out class
actions, unregulated contingent fees, and the ―American‖ cost rule
that does not require a plaintiff to pay a successful defendant‘s
litigation costs.15 This combination necessarily attracts big-ticket
private cases to the United States, even when the factual nexus to the
United States is tenuous or almost non-existent.
In response, foreign governments have filed numerous amicus
briefs over the years, urging the U.S. appellate courts to curb what
they regard as ―judicial imperialism‖ by U.S. courts in private civil
cases under other federal statutes.16 These briefs have become more
successful in recent years in persuading the U.S. Supreme Court to
reject U.S. jurisdiction over commercial cases by non-citizens
claiming damages for foreign conduct. The most prominent examples
are F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,17 where the Court
rejected foreign purchasers‘ Sherman Act antitrust claims, and
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,18 where the Court rejected
15. See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is
the United States the “Odd Man Out” In How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT‘L &
COMP. L. 361, 381–88 (1999) (discussing international disfavor with the contingency fee
system and highlighting foreign alternatives); see also Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra
note 3, at 26–29 (discussing the plaintiff-favoring rules adopted by the United States).
16. In Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764, the United Kingdom and Canada filed amicus briefs
in support of the foreign defendants on the issue of jurisdiction. See Brief for the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764 (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128); Brief of the
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certain Petitioners, Hartford Fire,
509 U.S. 764 (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128).
17. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Multiple governments filed amicus briefs in support of reversal
in Empagran. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and
Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724);
Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Empagran, 542
U.S. 155 (No. 03-724); Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724).
18. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). Multiple governments filed amicus briefs in support of the
defendant in Morrison. See, e.g., Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191); Brief of the Government
of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Defendants–
Appellees, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191); Brief of the United Kingdom of Great
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non-resident foreign shareholders‘ securities claims based on the
Securities Exchange Act.
Kiobel differed from these earlier cases in a few respects. First,
the plaintiffs were alleging rather generalized wrongs as opposed to
specific cartel overcharges or market-distorting misrepresentations.
Second, the non-resident class of plaintiffs would be harder to
identify and manage by U.S. courts and their losses will be more
difficult to identify and quantify than losses suffered by overseas
purchasers of products or securities. These realities underscore the
basic question raised by Kiobel: why should international law on
extraterritorial jurisdiction somehow be watered down because the
non-resident alien plaintiffs are claiming compensation for human
rights injuries suffered abroad, rather than for the types of
commercial injuries one finds in antitrust or securities cases? Asking
this question generates a series of significant underlying questions
not only about international law but also about the history and
purpose of the ATS, as well as its efficacy and fairness as a device
for compensating the victims of foreign human rights wrongs.
II. THE GOALS OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The ATS was enacted by the first Congress in 1789 under the
newly-adopted U.S. Constitution. Its origins and goals are both
obscure and seemingly limited. In the wake of several attacks on
foreign ambassadors to the new nation, Congress apparently wanted
to enable injured ambassadors to recover damages without having to
rely on state courts.19 In addition, there were ongoing disputes over
foreign ships that had been seized or damaged during the
Revolutionary War.20 Finally, piracy on the high seas was already
recognized as an exception to the normal territoriality-based rules and
was therefore the one area where universal civil jurisdiction was
already recognized under international law.21

Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morrison, 130
S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191).
19. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts‟ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 488–510 (1986). But
see Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT‘L L. 587, 637–45
(2002).
20. See Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995).
21. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (―[I]n the 18th
century, nations reached consensus not only on the substantive principle that acts of piracy
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The Kiobel plaintiffs simply sought to have the Supreme Court
adopt a new, expanded rule on extraterritorial jurisdiction for human
rights victims that goes well beyond (1) traditional international law
recognized by international tribunals and most foreign courts, and (2)
the limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction that the modern Supreme
Court has recognized in dealing with disputes involving claims under
antitrust, securities, and other U.S. regulatory statutes. The plaintiffs‘
counsel and their supporting amici had to argue, in essence, that the
ATS puts violations of ―the law of nations‖ on a different
jurisdictional plane when foreign victims are claiming compensation
for human rights injuries suffered abroad—as distinguished from
commercial injuries that non-resident victims may suffer from a
global cartel or securities fraud.22
Approaching this type of litigation in a way that is sympathetic
to victims still leaves us asking a series of significant questions about
the statutory purposes and likely effectiveness of such an
extraterritorial crusade:
(a) What is the principal purpose of an ATS case like
Kiobel being brought principally on behalf of
alien, non-resident plaintiffs absent from the
United States? To compensate the victims? Punish
wrongdoers? Or to deter corporations from
investing in poorer countries with ethnic conflicts,
legal instability, and/or dodgy political leadership?
(b) If the principal purpose is to compensate victims,
how can this be practically accomplished when the
plaintiff-victims are resident in the territory of the
wrongdoing state found by a U.S. jury to have
engaged in grievous violations of international
law? Should the U.S. jury still be awarding
damages to the non-resident victims if it has
become quite clear that the wrongdoing
government would not let payments flow through
its payments systems to the thousands, possibly

were universally wrong but also on the jurisdictional principle that any nation that found a
pirate could prosecute him.‖).
22. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross-Appellees at 48–58, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876).
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(c) To the extent that a public purpose of ATS tort
litigation is to deter prospective wrongdoers in the
field, how effective is penalizing shareholders of a
foreign corporation in causing lawless soldiers,
militia, torturers, policemen, or jailers to refrain
from acting cruelly on behalf of the wrongdoing
state? Isn‘t this a second- or third-best alternative
form of deterrence compared with using
international law to punish or penalize the
wrongdoing culprits directly under the Rome
Convention establishing the International Criminal
Court?24
(d) If a major purpose of this type of ATS litigation is
to pressure a government with a bad human rights
record to change its ways by deterring major
foreign investment in the country, doesn‘t such a
campaign, if successful, just amount to a privately
organized trade embargo—which may be
consistent or inconsistent with ongoing diplomatic
efforts by the United States and other democratic
governments? Moreover, like a trade embargo,
doesn‘t ATS litigation tend to primarily penalize
the foreign residents who would be denied
whatever jobs and other economic opportunities
that the inbound investment or commerce might
have generated?25

23. Note that it is the foreign state that must be the central source of a violation under
―the law of nations,‖ while corporations, which are the private plaintiffs‘ principal targets in
an ATS civil damages case, are charged with being aiders and abettors of the sovereign‘s
alleged wrongs.
24. I have long believed that, in the antitrust field where I regularly work, just imposing
large fines and damages on a corporation is an insufficient form of deterrence, and therefore
it is necessary to provide direct, painful sanctions against the wrongdoing individuals who
work or act on behalf of the corporation. See Donald I. Baker, Punishment for Cartel
Participants in the U.S.: A Special Model?, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS (Caron Beaton-Wells
& Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011). In the ATS context, the point is even stronger because the
principal wrongdoers are normally not employees or agents of the corporation being brought
into the case as an aider or abettor.
25. The post-apartheid South African Government has made this argument in opposing
ATS claims based on the misdeeds of the former apartheid government. See Neth.–U.K.
Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 24–26; see also id. app. at 1a–15a (reprinting the Declaration
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III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS HAVE REPEATEDLY OPPOSED HAVING
U.S. COURTS EXERCISE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER
DISPUTES INVOLVING INJURIES CAUSED TO FOREIGN PARTIES
OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES
As already noted, the second Anglo–Dutch amicus brief in
Kiobel is the latest in a long string of foreign government amicus
briefs opposing U.S. exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil
cases brought by private plaintiffs in the U.S. courts.26 The ―Interest
of the Amici‖ section in this recent brief articulates these
fundamental jurisdictional concerns very clearly:
The Governments . . . are committed to the rule of
law, including the promotion of, and protection
against violations of, human rights. . . .
Nevertheless, just as international law imposes
human rights obligations on States, it imposes
restraints on the assertion of jurisdiction by one State
over civil actions between persons that primarily
concern another State. Jurisdictional restraints are a
fundamental underpinning of the international legal
order and are essential to maintaining international
peace and comity. The Governments are, therefore,
opposed to broad assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over alien persons arising out of foreign
disputes with little, or no, connection to the United
States . . . .
This brief is intended to set out the views of two
nations that historically have been concerned with the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the U.S.
courts because of its inconsistency with international
law. . . . This brief is purely intended to set out the
Governments‟ view of the most relevant international
legal principles and takes no position on the

by Penuell Mpapa Maduna, South African Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development of the Republic of South Africa, dated July 11, 2003, submitted in opposition
to assertion of U.S. jurisdiction in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2002)).
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents app. at 1a–
6a, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (listing the
twenty-two amicus briefs and diplomatic notes opposing U.S. jurisdiction in ATS cases).

3-Baker

2013]

10/2/2013 9:09 AM

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

51

underlying factual and legal disputes between the
parties to this particular case.27
Later in their brief, the British and Dutch governments describe
the legal responses of other foreign governments to ―what they
regarded as entirely inappropriate exercises of U.S. extraterritorial
jurisdiction by courts and, occasionally, by legislatures.‖28 The most
dramatic part of the earlier history involved foreign parliaments
enacting so-called ―blocking statutes‖ that (1) prevented a
corporation subject to the foreign government‘s jurisdiction from
providing information to a U.S. court in an extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and/or (2) prevented the foreign sovereign‘s courts from
recognizing certain U.S. judgments based on extraterritorial
jurisdiction.29 These statutes, which were enacted by the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, South Africa, and several
Canadian provinces in the 1980s, were triggered by intense foreign
political and diplomatic reaction to private U.S. antitrust suits against
foreign uranium producers that participated in a distressed-industry
cartel orchestrated by the foreign governments.30 In addition, foreign
courts have sometimes rejected discovery requests made by U.S.
parties under the Hague Convention, when the foreign court has
regarded the U.S. case on which the discovery request was based as
resting on an improper assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
U.S. court.31
Thus, Kiobel is only the latest chapter in a longstanding story
about foreign government dissatisfaction with private U.S. litigation
brought against foreign nationals for offshore conduct, particularly in
the antitrust area. ―Fortunately,‖ the British and Dutch governments
added in 2013, ―such disputes seem to have become considerably less
frequent and dramatic in recent years.‖32
27. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 1–4 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 29.
29. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.);
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (U.K.); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act, 1985, R.S.C. c. F-29 (Can.). See generally Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign
Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 247 (1982) (discussing the
implementation of foreign blocking statutes).
30. I know from being personally involved that the level of foreign government outrage
was enhanced by the fact that the challenged cartel was created at the behest of the foreign
governments in response to a U.S. embargo on foreign uranium imports designed to protect
domestic U.S. uranium miners from additional competition in a distressed market.
31. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81
(H.L. 1977) (U.K.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39, 41 (Can.).
32. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 29.
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IV. THE QUESTION OF COMITY
A crucial aspect of the wave of ATS litigation is that it is often
conducted by private lawyers with an economic incentive to litigate,
regardless of the diplomatic difficulties they may cause for other
human rights initiatives that sympathetic governments are pursuing.
Unsurprisingly, other governmental amicus briefs in Kiobel,
including those submitted by the U.S. Solicitor General and the
European Commission, did not contemplate or advocate the kinds of
unqualified universal jurisdiction advocated by the plaintiffs‘ counsel
and some of their supporting amici in Kiobel.33
The importance of comity is obvious. Imagine the likely U.S.
political reaction if some foreign country with a very different legal
system, for example China or Egypt, enacted a statute exercising
universal jurisdiction over numerous U.S. and other non-resident
foreign corporations for anything that its courts regard as ―human
rights‖ violations (or ―blasphemy‖) anywhere in the world!
What the foreign governments described in their Kiobel briefs is
only part of a long-standing story about foreign government
dissatisfaction with private U.S. litigation against foreign nationals
for offshore conduct.34 The comity concern becomes clearer when a
big foreign enterprise, like Royal Dutch Shell, is sued in U.S. courts
for wrongs that occurred outside of the United States, and thereby
able to defend itself under the more balanced litigation systems that
the foreign sovereigns have established to resolve claims against their
citizens, residents, and entrepreneurs.35
The comity situation would be different if the U.S. courts only
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction against U.S. corporations for
alleged human rights abuses in a faraway country, for then the

33. For discussion of these briefs, see infra Part VI. The amicus brief submitted by the
Argentine Government was also fairly focused on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of what I
refer to as ―Individual Injury Cases‖ in Part V. See Brief for the Government of the
Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
34. Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 33, at 11.
35. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 18–23 (discussing the extent to which
Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo–Dutch corporation, might be sued in the domestic courts in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands).
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―nationality‖ principle of jurisdiction could be brought into play.36
Even so, this could require a more specific extraterritorial mandate
than that present in the ATS because any such nationality-based
jurisdictional claim would be subject to the presumption that U.S.
statutes do not have extraterritorial application, absent explicit
provision for it.37
V. THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS‘ ULTIMATE CONCERN MAY BE
ABOUT USING THE UNIQUE U.S. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES TO
BRING NUMEROUS NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS INTO
U.S. COURTS TO CLAIM DAMAGES FOR FARAWAY TORTS
There have been essentially two kinds of modern ATS cases:
(1) an individual victim‘s claims against the individual wrongdoer(s)
who mistreated him, and (2) class action claims against one or more
foreign corporations for aiding and abetting a foreign government‘s
widespread human rights abuses. The first category (―Individual
Injury Cases‖) includes the landmark Second Circuit decision that
ushered in the modern ATS litigation era, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,38
and the Supreme Court‘s only prior effort to sort out what kinds of
ATS claims could be made, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.39 The second
category (―Foreign Group Redress Cases‖) is typified by Kiobel and
by the class action cases brought on behalf of millions of South
African residents against companies that had invested in South Africa
during the apartheid era.40
The Foreign Group Redress Cases seem to be much the more
serious concern to foreign governments because these cases (1) have
become the predominant form of ATS litigation, and (2) are so risky
and expensive for the international corporations which foreign
governments may often want to encourage to invest in poorer foreign
countries. The Kiobel plaintiffs and their supporting amici have
written quite a lot about the historic ―transitory tort‖ doctrine and
why it supports their position, with particular emphasis on the Second
Circuit‘s 1980 Filártiga decision.41 The ―transitory tort‖ doctrine, in
36. See U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 21 (suggesting that the Petitioner‘s situation
may be different if U.S. courts were only exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction).
37. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
38. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
39. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
40. See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
41. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae South African Jurists Anton Katz, Maz
du Plessis, and Christopher Gevers, in Support of Petitioners at 6–12, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
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essence, holds that a forum state may adjudicate a dispute between
foreign parties within its territory over a tort that may have occurred
in a foreign jurisdiction, applying the law of the place of the wrong.42
Filártiga was essentially such a case. Both parties were citizens
of Paraguay, where the alleged wrongdoing took place. Both the
defendant and the plaintiff were residing in the United States when
the plaintiff brought the case.43 The only difference from the classic
―transitory tort‖ case was that, by virtue of the ATS, the U.S. court
applied ―the law of nations‖ rather than Paraguayan law to the
tortious conduct that had occurred in Paraguay.44
However, Filártiga (and Sosa too) have little to do with the
realities of the Kiobel-type Foreign Group Redress Cases. If the only
Kiobel plaintiffs were a handful of Nigerians resident in the United
States, the case almost certainly would not be in the Supreme Court
in 2013. Instead, it would probably have been treated as a transitory
tort case to which Filártiga could be applied and a small ―U.S.
resident Nigerians only‖ class could be employed.45
But what had made Kiobel a source of great practical concern to
foreign governments was the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 to certify a very large class of faraway plaintiffs with no nexus to
the United States.46
In this connection, it is important to remember how unique, and
sometimes controversial, our U.S. class action system is around the
world. No other country, I believe, has created an opt-out class action
system without a ―loser pays‖ cost rule.47 Opt-out rules tend to create
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (describing the ―transitory tort
doctrine‖ and its use in South Africa); Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 33 (addressing Filártiga and
Individual Injury Cases under international law and the Argentine Constitution).
42. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims:
Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1, 68–69 (1985)
(discussing the origins of the transitory tort doctrine and its application to ATS cases).
43. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79.
44. Id. at 878.
45. The fact that Kiobel, like Filártiga, originated in the Second Circuit makes it even
more likely that the earlier precedent would have been applied in this way.
46. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 28.
47. The Canadian province of British Columbia comes closest to providing an exception
to this generalization. It does provide opt-out class actions, without requiring the losing
plaintiffs to pay the defendants‘ litigation costs in such cases. However, this remedy is only
for classes of British Columbia residents. Canada‘s other provinces generally have opt-out
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much larger classes of plaintiffs, which are often more difficult to
manage than a class in an opt-in class action system.48 Moreover,
certification of a large class greatly increases the economic pressures
on defendants to settle even potentially defensible cases.49 Many
countries, as well as the European Commission, consider some form
of collective redress desirable, but none has thought that the U.S.
approach is correct.50 Instead, almost every country that has
authorized collective actions has adopted some form of opt-in class
action or representative action, nearly always coupled with the
jurisdiction‘s normal ―loser pays‖ cost rule, which is seen as a
safeguard against weak or frivolous litigation.51 The two major
exceptions are Australia and the Netherlands, which have created optout class actions, but still with ―loser pays‖ cost rules.52

class actions covering their own residents, and with varying cost rules. Thus, Canada‘s
largest province, Ontario, has a ―loser pays‖ cost rule which enables the defendant to recover
costs either when the representative plaintiffs fail at the initial class certification stage of an
opt-out class action or when the class action fails. The third major province, Quebec, permits
only very limited cost recovery by a successful defendant in an opt-out class action. Unlike
the United States, Canada does not have a nationwide system of federal trial courts and thus
even major securities and antitrust litigation against a nationwide wrong still can end up
being pursued via different, parallel class actions in the different provincial courts under
their varied rules, rather than being consolidated in a single court as tends to happen in the
United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1407.
48. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529 (2004) (discussing broadly the issues surrounding the opt-out doctrine).
49. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2001) (―An order
granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.‖ (citing Comm.
Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f))).
50. See Toward a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps, ¶¶ 6,
17, SEC (2010) 1192 final (Oct. 5, 2010) (―Mechanisms of collective redress could be
considered . . . to remedy the current shortcomings in the enforcement of EU law. . . . Any
European approach to collective redress would have to avoid from the outset the risk of
abusive litigation. Such abuses have occurred in the US with its ‗class actions‘ system. This
form of collective redress contains strong economic incentives for parties to bring a case to
court even if, on the merits, it is not well founded. These incentives are the result of a
combination of several factors, in particular, the availability of punitive damages, the
absence of limitations as regards standing (virtually anybody can bring an action on behalf of
an open class of injured parties) the possibility of contingency fees for attorney and the
wide-ranging discovery procedure for procuring evidence. Because of the increased risk of
abusive litigation resulting from these combined incentives, we believe that these features
are not compatible with the European legal tradition. We therefore firmly oppose introducing
„class actions‟ along the US model into the EU legal order.‖).
51. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 28.
52. Australia authorizes class actions, but they are subject to the normal Australian ―loser
pays‖ cost rules. Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.), discussed
in Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support
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Kiobel and other Foreign Group Redress cases thus differ from
the antitrust, securities, and labor standards cases that have occupied
the Supreme Court for the past two decades.53 In those cases, foreign
governments were very much concerned about the U.S. class action
plaintiffs seeking to export U.S. substantive law for use in
adjudicating overseas disputes among foreign parties—thereby
effectively foreclosing the more balanced remedies that they have
chosen for their own courts.54 Foreign governments supported the
Supreme Court‘s modern presumption against extraterritorial
application of law, absent clear contrary intent from Congress. In the
ATS cases, there is no disagreement that the substantive law is
international public law as embodied in federal common law, and the
controversial export is U.S. procedures that generate large classes of
non-resident plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for wrongs that occur
overseas.55
The supporters of the Kiobel plaintiffs seem to have assumed
that once you have a few representative class plaintiffs resident in the
United States, you have a ―transitory tort case,‖ and, after that,
everything is governed by the procedural rules of the forum, i.e.
Rule 23. This totally ignores considerations of international comity
when dealing with a unique procedural rule that totally changes the
nature of the case. Then, it seems that one must look at the
―substance vs. procedure‖ distinction, as federal courts were required
to do in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.56

of the Defendants–Appellees at 17–23, Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010) (No. 08-1191).
53. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (employment practices);
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (antitrust and trade
regulation); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869 (securities law).
54. For example, no foreign system provides the mandatory treble damages or one-way
cost recovery rule for antitrust violations that are contained in Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
55. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 27–28 (outlining the procedural
advantages for plaintiffs in U.S. courts).
56. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). What this post-Erie distinction seems to amount to in practice is
that, if the rule in question essentially changes the outcome, it is regarded as ―substantive‖ so
that the state rule will prevail. See id. at 78.
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VI. THE U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
OFFERED SOME TAILORED VARIATIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN THEIR AMICUS BRIEFS IN KIOBEL
The second U.S. Brief was reasonably close to the Neth.–U.K.
Brief and was labeled as being ―in Partial Support of Affirmance.‖57
The Solicitor General recommended affirmance of the dismissal
because:
In this case, foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign
corporate defendants for aiding and abetting a foreign
sovereign‘s treatment of its own citizens and in its
own territory, without any connection to the United
Sates beyond the residence of the named plaintiffs in
this putative class action and the corporate defendants‘
presence for jurisdictional purposes. Creating a federal
common-law cause of action in these circumstances
would not be consistent with Sosa‘s requirement of
judicial restraint.58
After noting the numerous foreign government protests against
U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases, the U.S.
Brief added a comity-sensitive point: ―The ‗great caution‘ urged in
Sosa counsels against recognizing a federal common-law cause of
action that has the inherent potential to provoke the international
friction the ATS was designed to prevent.‖59
The U.S. Brief also emphasized that ―[t]his case is quite different
from Filártiga. The United States could not be viewed as having
harbored or otherwise provided refuge to an actual torturer or other
‗enemy of all mankind.‘‖60 But the Solicitor General added that the
Filártigia plaintiffs would still have a cause of action for overseas
wrongs under the Torture Victims Protection Act—which the U.S.
Brief described as ―an express, but carefully circumscribed, cause of
action available only against an individual for acts of torture or

57. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9.
58. Id. at 13–14.
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id. at 19. The U.S. State Department had been giving Filártiga a much broader
reading in its prior dialogue with foreign governments. Interestingly, the State Department
was not a party to the second U.S. Brief, although it appeared on the first U.S. Brief
supporting the Kiobel plaintiffs on the issue of corporate liability.
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extrajudicial killing and only when acting under color of foreign
law.‖61
Finally, the U.S. Brief left open the possibility of the Supreme
Court recognizing extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases ―where
the defendant is a U.S. national or corporation, or where the alleged
conduct of the foreign sovereign occurred outside its territory, or
where conduct by others occurred within the U.S. or on the high
seas.‖62
The brief that the European Commission filed ―on Behalf of the
European Union‖ supported neither side, but it was closer to the
plaintiffs‘ position on extraterritorial jurisdiction than the U.S. Brief
was.63 In particular, the E.U. Brief advocated allowing in ATS cases
―the exercise of universal jurisdiction to reach conduct and parties
with no nexus to the United States—but only when the conduct at
issue could also give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction.‖64 The
E.U. Brief explained that such ―[u]niversal jurisdiction is . . . founded
on the sheer reprehensibility of certain crimes of universal concern
which international law permits States to punish without regard to
territoriality or the nationality of the offenders.‖65 The European
Commission precedents that were cited in support of using universal
criminal jurisdiction to justify universal civil jurisdiction under
international law were found principally in a few U.S. lower court
ATS decisions in cases where the United Kingdom or other foreign
governments had appeared as amici to argue against such a rule.66
61. Id. at 20–21. The Torture Victims Protection Act clearly does not cover the type of
Foreign Group Injury claims against corporations that are alleged in Kiobel. See Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (rejecting organizational liability under the Torture
Victims Protection Act ).
62. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 21. This vague language was presumably inserted
to mollify the Legal Adviser‘s Office at the State Department, which has had a more
expansive view of international jurisdiction in ATS cases. See supra note 60.
63. Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter E.U. Brief].
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. The E.U. Brief cites several examples, the most recent being Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct.
1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 2013 WL
3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013). See E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 3, 23, 32. In Sarei, the
U.K. and Australian Governments filed two amicus briefs opposing U.S. jurisdiction at
different stages of the interminable Ninth Circuit process, and then wrote a third joint brief to
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There is no unanimity among the E.U. Member States on the
E.U. Brief‘s assertion regarding universal civil jurisdiction. The E.U.
Brief is subject to classic international lawyers‘ criticism as being too
hasty in attempting to extrapolate a controversial principle of
universal civil jurisdiction from a well-established principle of
universal criminal jurisdiction. International law does not develop
this way; rather, it requires sufficient evidence of state practice and
opinio juris, which are still lacking in the area of universal civil
jurisdiction.67
Moreover, the European Commission‘s ―universal jurisdiction‖
proposal, if accepted, would often cause practical difficulties for a
U.S. district court. In addition to a class certification proceeding
under Rule 23, the court would be required to conduct an initial minitrial over its jurisdiction to determine whether the wrongs alleged by
the plaintiffs sufficiently meet the European Commission‘s ―sheer
reprehensibility‖ threshold standard, and thus qualify for ―criminal‖
liability under international law. This would not necessarily be a
quick or easy task for the court, given the likely absence of foreign
witnesses or documents in such cases.
Both the E.U. Brief and the second U.S. Brief do broadly agree
on an important point that ATS plaintiffs generally oppose: ―If a
federal common-law cause of action is created under the ATS for
extraterritorial violations of the law of nations in certain
circumstances, doctrines such as exhaustion [of foreign remedies]
and forum non-conveniens should be applied at the outset of the
litigation and with special force.‖68 The British, Dutch, and

the Supreme Court supporting the Defendant‘s petition for certiorari challenging the Ninth
Circuit‘s 6-5 en banc decision in favor of universal jurisdiction. See Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto
Cert. Br., supra note 5, at 1–4. Immediately following Kiobel, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari in Rio Tinto and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of it
Kiobel decision. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.).
67. The E.U. Brief also overlooks the practical reality that the instigators of civil and
criminal litigation have entirely different roles and responsibilities, even where the
underlying wrong may be the same. In the criminal context, the prosecutor is a public
official holding a judicial or executive office. In the civil context of an ATS class action case
in the United States, the plaintiffs‘ counsel is likely to be a legal entrepreneur specializing in
class action litigation, often on a contingent fee basis. The two are not remotely comparable.
The private class action counsel need not respond to concerns of comity vis-à-vis foreign
governments, or the broader political concerns that such a case might cause for other U.S.
interests (e.g., retaliatory boycotts or trade reprisals).
68. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 22. The European Commission has consistently
articulated that ―before the United States may exercise universal jurisdiction under the ATS,
international law requires exhaustion of local and international remedies or, alternatively, the
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Australian governments repeatedly made this argument in their
amicus briefs.69
Moreover, the European Commission makes a point clear that is
implicit in the U.S. Brief—namely that it is not only exhaustion of
local remedies in the place where the challenged wrong allegedly
occurred, but also in the jurisdiction where a defendant‘s enterprise is
principally based. Thus, the E.U. Brief quoted with approval an
earlier German brief in the Kiobel case that stated:
While it certainly would be inappropriate to require
plaintiffs to exhaust their legal remedies in countries
which have a proven record of human rights violations
and no due process, it is certainly reasonable and
appropriate to require a victim of a tort committed in
a third country by a German tortfeasor to go to
Germany and utilize the legal system of the Federal
Republic of Germany to seek legal satisfaction.70
The Netherlands and United Kingdom also urged that U.S.
courts, in applying the ―exhaustion of remedies‖ principle in an ATS
case, look beyond the place of the wrong and ―ought to be obliged to
consider whether another state has a closer nexus to the dispute—
namely, superior access to evidence and/or the presence of nationals
or residents as defendants within its jurisdiction.‖71 Their brief
explained when the British and Dutch national courts would accept
jurisdiction over alleged human rights injuries caused by their
corporations of subsidiaries.72
Finally, using slightly different language, both the E.U. and U.S.
briefs recognized the importance of the ―substantial interests of other
sovereigns in adjudicating disputes over incidents occurring in their
own territory, or involving their own nationals outside the United
States‖ because doing so ―would help to mitigate the potential for
claimant‘s demonstration that such remedies are unavailable or their pursuit is futile.‖ E.U.
Brief, supra note 63, at 30
69. See Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto Cert. Br., supra note 5, at 15–18; Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. I,
supra note 6, at 33–34.
70. E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 32 n.82 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae the Federal
Republic of Germany in Support of Respondents at 13, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Ger. Kiobel Br.]) (emphasis added)
71. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 34.
72. Id. at 18–23.
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international friction arising from the recognition of an extraterritorial
cause of action based on the ATS.‖73
VII. CONCLUSION: POLITICS, LAW, AND EMOTIONS IN AN EVER MORE
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
A broad, loosely organized human rights community around the
world has invested much energy and emotion into the Kiobel case
and ATS litigation in U.S. courts.74 Strong campaigns have been
mounted against foreign governments that were participating as amici
in the Kiobel case or considering whether to do so.75 The decibel
level increased substantially after the Court accepted the
jurisdictional argument emphasized by the Dutch and British
Governments in their first Kiobel brief and took the rare step of
setting the case down for rebriefing and reargument on the question:
Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than
the United States.76
In the shrill debates that swirled through various national
capitals in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s reargument order, the
question seemed to be: ―How could a democratic government that
purports to be seriously concerned about human rights violations
possibly be willing to support any corporation in a major lawsuit
where it is charged with having committed major human rights
violations?‖77

73. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 25–26; see also E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 4–5.
74. See, e.g., Brief on Reargument of Amici Curiae International Human Rights
Organizations in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
75. Germany, which had submitted a brief supporting respondents during the first round
of briefing in Kiobel, did not participate in the second round of briefing on jurisdiction. The
German brief was quoted in the E.U. Brief on a significant jurisdictional point, during the
second round of Kiobel briefing. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The reasons for
Germany‘s decision not to participate in the second round of Kiobel briefing were not
announced, but the choice occurred right in the middle of the period when the human rights
community was generating public criticism against foreign governments for having opposed
U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in Kiobel and other ATS cases.
76. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
77. See Geoffrey Robertson, Why Does the U.K. Defend Corporations and Not Their
Victims?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/comment/why-does-the-uk-defend-corporations-and-not-their-victims-8399557.html
(criticizing the British Government for its Kiobel amicus briefs, asserting that ―[t]he only
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The answer—a good appellate lawyer‘s answer—is that ―it is all
about important principles, not particular parties or the emotions that
they generate.‖78 Common-law-trained lawyers are well-aware of the
historic reality that some of the great principles of constitutional law
have been established in cases where one feels no emotional
sympathy for the party who successfully raised the seminal point.79
Conversely, we can think of famous cases where the law would have
been better served if the court had been less sympathetic to a
prevailing party.80
For the U.S. class action lawyers interested in human rights, a
Kiobel-type Foreign Group Redress Case may seem to be their only
option in dealing directly with foreign human rights wrongs, and for
their overseas political supporters, the plaintiff-favoring U.S.
litigation system may seem the best option for making somebody pay
a lot of money for collective human tragedy.81 By contrast,
governments committed to alleviating human rights wrongs have a
much broader range of legitimate options for dealing with the types
of government-supported human rights abuses that rise to the level of
being potential violations of international law. These options include:
state-to-state litigation before international courts, supporting
criminal prosecutions before the International Criminal Court,
unilateral or collective diplomacy vis-à-vis the offending
government, cutting off foreign aid or normal trade relationships, and

redress is to sue in the U.S. under [ATS] a unique statute which permits victims from
anywhere in the world to sue any company or person for a wrong ‗committed in violation of
the law of the nations.‘‖).
78. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer‟s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 111 (1995) (discussing the defense attorney‘s obligation to represent not only the
purely innocent but also the despicable).
79. The most obvious examples are in criminal cases where the defendant, who clearly
appears to have been guilty, has his conviction reversed because the police or the prosecutors
have obtained evidence in some constitutionally impermissible way. See, e.g., Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont‘l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 705 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (―[I]f we assume that the price discrimination proven against the respondents had
any effect on competition, that effect must have been beneficent. . . . [T]he Court has fallen
into the error of reading the [statute] as protecting competitors, instead of
competition . . . .‖).
81. See Robertson, supra note 77 (―If companies cannot be prosecuted for international
crimes, all the more reason they should be sued for damages. The profits of their illegal
conduct should be re-distributed to their victims.‖).
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even occasional military intervention.82 In such circumstances,
concerned governments, including the U.S. government, are very
likely to see private class actions in the U.S. courts against non-state
actors as a less effective way to deal with most serious human rights
wrongs.83
Kiobel has been the latest battle in which numerous foreign
governments have urged jurisdictional restraint on the U.S. courts. In
their Kiobel briefs, the British and Dutch governments went out of
their way to emphasize that they were focusing on the fundamental
question of ―why is this case even in a U.S. court when it has no
connection to the United States?‖—without taking any position on
the underlying claims against Royal Dutch Petroleum.
As noted above, the foreign governments have been more
successful since 2000 in urging an increasingly conservative U.S.
Supreme Court to adopt rules that tend to restrain the jurisdictional
appetite of foreign plaintiffs bringing claims in the U.S. courts.84
Cases like Empagran and Morrison have involved large opt-out class
action claims of the type that these foreign governments have chosen
not to authorize in their own courts.85 Having adopted some fairly
clear comity-driven rules to limited U.S. forum shopping by counsel
for overseas victims of alleged international antitrust and securities
abuses, the Supreme Court might reasonably have been expected to
ask: when, if ever, should an ATS class action case be allowed to
proceed to trial without the kind of factual nexus that has long been
recognized as necessary for a national court to exercise civil
jurisdiction under traditional international law? (The answer of the
Court‘s five-member conservative majority in Kiobel appears to be
somewhere between ―never‖ and ―hardly ever‖ on a narrow negative
spectrum.)86

82. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 630–33 (2004) (outlining various
mechanisms to enforce human rights laws and principles).
83. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 35 (―[I]t has been the longstanding
view of the Governments that the most effective way to ensure that there is no impunity for
human rights abuses is to encourage and strengthen States to comply with the human rights
obligations owed to those within their jurisdictions.‖).
84. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
85. As noted, Australia does allow opt-out class actions, but subject to the country‘s
normal ―loser pays‖ cost rule. See supra note 52.
86. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (―We therefore
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The bottom line, as seen from outside the United States,
essentially seems to be this: human rights abuses are a very important
international concern, but the United States ought to be looking more
to multilateral cooperation—as it has done in the torture victims area,
but failed to do with the International Criminal Court—rather than
just relying on highly-motivated private lawyers to bring broad class
action cases against foreign corporations on behalf of non-resident
victims for conduct having no effect within the United States. Thus,
for the Dutch and British governments, the ultimate principle was to
respect the jurisdictional restraints that international law has imposed
and continues to impose on national governments and national courts
because ―[j]urisdictional restraints are a fundamental underpinning
of the international legal order and are essential to maintaining
international peace and comity.‖87

concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.‖).
87. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis added).

